26 November 2007
Sometimes I am stunned at the stupidity of smart people. The music business has never been worse: compact disc sales are plummeting in all genres, the industry is in decline, and the root of it all is technological revolution. The controlling entities of the business—the major labels and their attorneys at the RIAA—have played chicken since the turn of the century and boil down their failure to the ridiculous meme that, “It’s impossible to compete with free.”
Tell that to the bottled water industry, who competes with tap water and ubiquitous public drinking fountains. Tell that to Starbucks, who’s created an empire on expensive coffee and has to not only compete with home brew, but the cheap stuff that McDonald’s has sold for decades. Tell that to the billion dollar cleaning services industry, which provides clean homes and businesses that could otherwise be done for free by inhabitants. Tell that to lawncare service companies, who do what our kids and fathers used to do on weekends. Tell that to private toll road developers, who bank on convenience trumping freeways. There are examples of competing with free (and near-free) all over the place.
But wait, you say: the music business is different than all those other guys because they are essentially competing against their own product . And yes, there are some logistical differences and legal implications that indeed make the music business unique, but the what doesn’t change is the importance of marketing in the value equation. Every industry has unique transaction scenarios that affect it, and using your uniqueness as an inability to compete isn’t believable. If the industry reduces their failure down to pricing competition, then they will always lose to the lowest price.
“Free” is simply a value holder in a transaction. It’s just a number, and its context is everything. In the music business, “free” is really no different from ”$.99” at iTunes—remember, Apple’s not making any money from selling songs at iTunes; iTunes merely functions as a marketing device for the iPod (which in turn was developed to sell more computers!) Apple sees iTunes as a cost of growing its computer business, and we see it as a buck a song. In fact, Apple determined the price point through marketing research; the price (correctly) isn’t based on the cost of running iTunes. It’s based on what Apple thinks consumers are willing to pay.
Massive leadership change is long overdue in the music industry and guys like Doug Morris have lived in denial for too long. Labels have been selling millions and millions of unprotected compact discs for the past decade, even though they’ve known that people could and were cloning those very CDs on their computer. They’ve been advised to lower the retail prices of compact discs and their attempt to do that was so weak that it came off like a publicity ploy. The majors were creamed by their weak Internet presence, they let decades of label brand development wash away with conglomeration, and they’ve shouted down naysayers in the press ever since Napster. They say they can’t compete with free but there’s not a lot of proof they could compete with $.99 songs at iTunes, either.
Filed under music industry business
Comments
While I agree with the sentiment and most of the points of this article, I’m wondering what you propose as a solution. A real price reduction in the cost of CDs back to the days of Warner Brothers’ Loss Leaders and $5 Lps? What about in the digital realm and the oft-repeated (but untrue) phrase that the 99 cent download on iTunes has saved the industry?
— Matt Berlyant 2007-11-29 11:05 #
I”m going to discuss a few solutions in my next posting, but the outlook is very dim if we use history as a guide. The short of it is that there’s probably no longer an industry-saving solution out there anymore and the large corporate industries involved have their hands (and assets) tied to the past. They can’t ditch CDs because they still amount to 75% of their gross income worldwide, and lowering the short term profit margins against a bet on technology or radical transformation saving their asses is probably too risky for any large corporation to consider. The major labels, who essentially run and fund the backbone of the industry, simply can’t change their business model fast enough because the new model provides a much smaller cashflow and likely, smaller future cashflows. As public companies, it would be suicidal to announce radical changes because investors are risk averse and that would undermine their financial position even more.
— John Davidson 2007-11-29 22:24 #
Apples and oranges. Bottled water and Starbucks market themselves as premium products. Coke, Pepsi and Starbucks could care less who drinks tap water or cheap coffee. And service industries such as lawn care are successful because they are basically selling you leisure time, which could also be viewed as a premium product.
The music industry is screwed because it killed its own retail base. It forced independent retailers (the lifeblood of the industry) to purchase thru distributors while big box stores were allowed to purchase directly from the labels, and the mom-and-pops couldn’t compete. By funneling your customers from record stores over to Wal-Mart/Best Buy/Amazon, you are essentially telling consumers that music is no longer a premium product. Now most consumers no longer see a premium value between a CD over an mp3, and they are no longer willing to pay the difference.
— Matt 2007-12-06 17:21 #